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This symposium has sought to examine the fragmentation of the international legal system.1 Such a task presupposes that international law
is, in fact, undergoing some form of fragmentation. A range of recent
scholarship has described this so-called fragmentation in various ways
and generally considered it a negative development, a threat to the legal
system as we know it.2 This commentary challenges both these assumptions by suggesting that international law is not fragmenting, but rather
is being transformed into a pluralist system. Instead of being undermined
by fragmentation, the rules, the institutions, and practices of the international legal order can be strengthened by the emergence of an
international legal pluralism.
The metaphors employed in the opening plenary to this symposium
are indicative of the diversity of views on the fragmentation of
international law. Professor Hafner described international law as
*
Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the
Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. The
author wishes to thank the Editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law for organizing the symposium.
1.
The symposium was specifically intended to “examine one of the defining problems
for the future of international law: the interplay between the current fragmentation of the international legal system and the simultaneous move of that system away from its traditional
status as the exclusive realm of states.”
2.
See Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It
Good or Bad?, 14 Leiden J. Int’l L. 267, 272 (2001) (noting that “the proliferation of international tribunals can [. . .] have adverse consequences”). See also Jonathan I. Charney, Is
International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 Recueil des Cours
105, 125 (1998) (observing that “[t]o the extent that international tribunals announce different
views on rules of general international law, the legitimacy of those rules in this fragile community may be placed at risk.”). C.f. William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of
International Criminal Law: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 Tex. Int’l L. J. 729, 755–61
(2003) (suggesting that the threat of fragmentation is minimal).
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consisting “mostly of erratic blocks and elements as well as different
partial systems.”3 For Professor Pauwelyn, international law is “a
universe of inter-connected islands.”4 These two statements describing
some degree of fragmentation contrast with Professor Rao’s observation
5
of an “emergence of an international legal community.” Likewise,
Professor Koch noted a “judicial dialogue” with prospects for “legal
6
multiculturalism.” While most observers agree that there is not a unified
international legal system, many still witness a significant degree of
interconnection within the system.
None of these various characterizations of the international legal system is wrong, but each focuses on a particular aspect of the development
of international law. A more complete analysis of the supposed fragmentation of international law requires an exploration of a number of trends
and the ways in which they interact. While such a broad consideration
will by its nature be far less detailed than many of the more specific inquiries of other papers in this volume, it provides a more holistic picture
of the changes presently affecting the international legal system—a picture that looks much less like fragmentation.
In asking whether international law is undergoing a fragmentation, at
least seven important trends merit consideration:
(1) the diversification of tribunals applying international law;
(2) the growth and potential conflict of legal norms;
(3) the increased access by non-state-actors to international legal
adjudication fora;
(4) the distinction between jurisdiction and applicable law in international tribunals;
(5) the rapid expansion of inter-judicial dialogue;
(6) the merging of procedure and tradition across courts and legal
systems; and
(7) the development of hybrid courts incorporating national and
international elements.
3.
Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law,
25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 849 (2004).
4.
Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 903 (2004).
5.
Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: a Reflection of
the Growing Strength of International Law or Its Fragmentation?, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 929
(2004).
6.
Charles H. Koch Jr., Judicial Dialogue for Legal Multiculturalism, 25 Mich. J.
Int’l L. 879 (2004).
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This commentary considers the interaction among these trends to
suggest both that the phenomenon of fragmentation and its dangers have
been overstated and that an emerging international legal pluralism can be
highly beneficial.

I. Fragmentation or Unity: Whither International Law?
Over the past two decades international law has grown, shifted and
expanded in numerous ways. Today, international law regulates a far
wider range of substantive issues, is generated by an ever-increasing
range of legal sources, and is enforced in far more courts and tribunals
than ever before. Though this system is considerably more complex than
it was a decade ago, these changes do not necessarily result in a fragmented legal system. Of the seven trends listed above, the first three
suggest fragmentation; in contrast, the last four point toward new forms
of interaction between national and international actors and the development of an international legal pluralism.
A. The Diversification of International Tribunals
The past fifteen years have witnessed an exponential increase in the
number of courts applying international law.7 New international tribunals
have arisen largely in response to functional needs. New problems have
emerged that require transnational solutions by international institutions
such as courts.8 P.S. Rao, writing in this volume, discusses the “functional need for the establishment of new international tribunals for a new
age,” citing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY, ICTR), the International Criminal Court (ICC)
and the Word Trade Organization (WTO) as prime examples. Other tribunals have been created by particular groups of states in response to
challenges of a particularly regional nature. Again in this volume,
Gerhard Hafner notes the growth of “regional fora [that] engage in the
formulation of international regulations.” Such regional courts include
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the African Court of Human and
People’s Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
An even more significant development is the ever-increasing number
of national courts applying international law. As early as 1900, the
United States Supreme Court found that international law was a part of

7.
For a discussion of some of these courts, see Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429, 437–39 (2003).
8.
See, e.g., Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State—Functionalism and International Organization 6–7 (1964).
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9

the law of the United States. However, for most of the past century,
there were few international legal cases in the national courts of any
country. Today, international law is becoming more and more becoming
a central part of domestic legal proceedings10 and a growing number of
national constitutions incorporate international law. The new constitution
of South Africa, for example, goes so far as to require courts to interpret
domestic law so as to be consistent with international law, dramatically
increasing the potential for international legal claims in domestic
courts.11 Similarly, the legislation of numerous countries now includes
domestic causes of action dependent on international legal rights. The
Alien Tort Claims Act and NAFTA Chapter XI actions are but two obvious examples in U.S. law. Whether prosecuting international crimes
12
under the principle of universal jurisdiction, examining the legality of
13
trade restrictions, applying international human rights norms,14 or adjudicating international environmental claims,15 the number of national
9.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 677 (1900) (observing that “[i]nternational law
is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction”).
10.
Today, in fact, there are extensive textbooks on international civil litigation in
American courts. See, e.g., Gary B. Born & David Westin, International Civil Litigation in US Courts: Commentary and Materials (3d ed. 1996); Ralph G. Steinhardt,
International Civil Litigation: Cases and Materials on the Rise of Intermestic
Law (2002).
11.
See South Africa Const. art. 233 (1996) (“When interpreting any legislation,
every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international
law.”).
12.
See, e.g., Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 2000).
13.
Chapter XI of the North American Free Trade Act, for example, allows investors to
seek relief against a government that denies or impairs its rights under NAFTA in an arbitral
tribunal. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, art. 1117, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 296, 639 [hereinafter NAFTA]. For an arbitral case under Chapter XI of NAFTA,
see Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. June 26, 2003), 42 ILM 811, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/22094.pdf.
14.
Human rights cases in national courts relying on international treaties are far too
numerous to list. See, e.g., Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal), 1998 (1) SA
765 (CC) (examining legal rights to medical and health care); Case of the Indigenous Organization of Antioquía (O.I.A.), Judgment No. T-380/93, Constitutional Court of Columbia,
September 13, 1993 (considering the rights of an indigenous community under the International Labor Organization Convention). For additional human rights cases in national courts,
see The International Dimension of Human Rights: A Guide for Application in Domestic Law, Inter-American Development Bank (2001).
15.
See, e.g., Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace
S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735. The case is a request for a preliminary ruling by the Appeal Court of
The Hague to interpret Article 5(3) of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction
and the enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters based on an underlying
national suit in a Dutch court for environmental damage.
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courts and arbitral tribunals actively applying international law is far
greater than it has ever been.
Some have viewed this expansion of international tribunals and the
increasing frequency of international claims in national courts as indicative of the fragmentation of the international legal system. As Rao
observes in this volume, the proliferation of such tribunals increases the
possibility of conflicting judgments—that two tribunals will “hold differently on the same subject matter.”16 Charles Koch’s discussion of the
conflicting holdings of the European Court to Human Rights (ECtHR)
17
18
and ECJ in the cases of Vermeulen and Emesa Sugar provides a useful
example of how two international courts can reach alternate holdings on
similar issues.19
An alternate perspective on the increasing number of fora for international legal adjudication is that international law is today more
relevant than it has ever been in the past. Most of these new transnational
tribunals and domestic invocations of international law have arisen based
on functional challenges—international trade, international crime, or
transborder pollution, to name a few. New courts are created to address
these emergent issues because an enforceable system of international law
offers an efficient and politically acceptable means of conflict resolution
within these functional areas. Admittedly, the rise of international courts
does increase the possibility of conflicting judgments, but it does so
within the context of a more, rather than less, important role for international law.
B. The Growing Density of International Law
A rapid expansion in the sheer number of international rules is reshaping the international legal system as we know it. For most of the
past four hundred years, international law provided a very thin set of
rules, regulating, for example, the conduct of diplomats, the law of the
high seas, or the territorial integrity of states.20 While the number of such
rules expanded slowly throughout the twentieth century, since the end of
WWII and particularly in the last two decades, the number of international legal rules has increased sharply.21 A wealth of new bilateral and
multilateral treaties, often in very specific substantive areas ranging from
the environment and trade to human rights and international crime,
16.
Rao, supra note 5, at 931.
17.
Vermuelen v. Belgium, App. No. 19075/91, Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (1996).
18.
Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v. Aruba, 2000 E.C.R. 667 (2000).
19.
Koch, supra note 6, at 880.
20.
See generally Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (1625); Emmerich de
Vattel, The Law of Nations Book II (1760).
21.
Hafner, supra note 3, at 849–51 (noting an “increase of international regulations”).
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places States under an ever-larger number of obligations. In effect, the
international legal system is “thicker” than it has ever been before. There
are far more diads (to use a term from political science) of legal obligation than there have ever been in the past.23
This increasing density of legal rules has likewise been interpreted
by some as indicative of fragmentation. After all, as new diads of obligation are added to the system, the potential for conflict among legal rules
increases. As the number of obligations State A owes to States B and C
increases, so too do the chances that an obligation A owes to B will be
incompatible with an obligation A owes to C. In his article in this volume, Joost Pauwelyn provides powerful examples of such conflicts in
the context of the WTO.24 International law does not presently provide a
25
sufficient set of rules for resolving such conflicts when they do arise.
Though such potential conflict is real, the increasing density of international law is again indicative of the growing importance of international
legal regimes. The creation of so many new legal obligations suggests
that areas previously within the exclusive purview of national politics are
becoming legalized.26
22.
A few examples of multilateral treaties deposited with the United Nations in the
past five years include the Optional Protocol on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 5, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/49 (Oct. 6, 1999); the International Convention on the Arrest of Ships, Mar. 19,
1999, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF/188.6, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
imo99d6.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2004); the Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes, June 17, 1999,
MP.WAT/2000/1, EUR/ICP/EHCO 020205/8Fin, available at http://www.unece.org/env/
documents/2000/wat/mp.wat.2000.1.e.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2004); the Food Aid Convention, Apr. 13, 1999, 2073 U.N.T.S. 135, available at http://r0.unctad.org/commodities/
agreements/foodaidconvention.pdf; the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade,
Sept. 10, 1998, art. 15, U.N. Doc. UNEP/FAO/PIC/5, available at http://www.pic.int/en/
ViewPage.asp?id=104; The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1988,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_
statute(e).pdf. For a more complete list of such multilateral treaties, see United Nations Treaty
Collection, Texts of Recently Deposited Multilateral Treaties, available at http://
untreaty.un.org/English/sample/notpubl.asp. The above list omits a host of regional and bilateral treaties that have expanded the web of obligations still further.
23.
“Diads of obligation” refers to the number of pairs of legal obligations in the international system. Thus the obligation state A owes to state B and vice versa is a single diad of
obligation. For example, in a system with three states entering into a multilateral treaty there
are three diads of obligation: between A and B, A and C, and B and C. With six states as parties to this same treaty, there would be fifteen diads of obligation. Concluding a second treaty
between these same six states, with respect to a different legal issue, would add another fifteen
diads of obligation. It is easy to see how the numbers of diads of obligation can quickly escalate as international law becomes increasingly dense.
24.
Pauwelyn, supra note 4, at 905.
25.
See generally id.
26.
See generally Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, in Legalization and World
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C. Expanding Access to International Fora
by Non-State Actors
A third important trend in international law is the expanding access
27
to international legal fora by non-state actors. Today, individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and even corporations have unprecedented
access to the international legal system, often without the traditional requirement of diplomatic protection whereby states would espouse the
claims of their citizens in international courts. Citizens of European Union member states can bring claims directly to the ECtHR; citizens of the
Americas can petition the Inter-American Human Rights Committee.
Likewise the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act opens the U.S. legal system for
individuals to bring international claims for money damages rooted in
international law.28 Individuals and nongovernmental organizations have
indirect access to the International Criminal Court through the submis29
sion of communications to the Office of the Prosecutor. While
corporations have long had access to the international system when their
claims were espoused by states, today they play an ever more direct role
in advising governments in WTO dispute settlement and can sometimes
bring claims directly under NAFTA Chapter XI. Individual access to
such fora is unprecedented and seems set to grow.30
Again, some commentators have interpreted this trend as movement
toward fragmentation, claiming that more individual access means more
cases, more courts, and a denser web of rights and obligations ripe for
potential conflict. True enough, but individual access to international
adjudication also greatly strengthens the international legal system.
Whereas political considerations often drastically limit the incentives of
states to bring international claims against other states, individuals are
Politics 73 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds. 2001) (discussing the growth of legalized dispute
resolution).
27.
See Keohane, Moravcsik & Slaughter, supra note 26, at 80 (discussing the importance of “access” as a variable in determining the effectiveness of a court or tribunal).
28.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
29.
See, e.g., Press Conference of the Prosecutor-Communications, 24 July 2003,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/newspoint/articles/19.html (noting that 472 communications from individuals and NGOs in 66 countries were received by the Court between July
2002 and July 2003). Note, however, that such communications do not obligate the prosecutor
to act. See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter Rome Statute],
July 17, 1998, art. 15(1)–(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (1998).
30.
See John E. Noyes, Panel Discussion: Association of American Law Schools Panel
on the International Criminal Court, 36 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 223, 225 (1999) (observing that
“[s]ince World War II, over a dozen regional and global international courts and tribunals, not
including ad hoc arbitral tribunals, have been established, many of them allowing individual
access.”). For a discussion of individual access in the human rights field, see Lawrence R.
Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 285, 288 (1999) (noting that
human rights courts, quasi-judicial tribunals, and treaty bodies “now regularly adjudicate
petitions filed by victims of human rights abuses against national governments”).
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far more willing to act to ensure that international law is enforced
wherever possible.31 As Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued, “it is possible
to imagine individuals as monitors of government compliance with
agreed rules, whether arrived at through a domestic or an international
legislative process.”32 Individuals are thus becoming the “muscle” of the
international law, helping develop and strengthen that system.
Taken collectively, the above three trends have both positive and
negative implications. Ever-growing numbers of cases relying on international law are being brought to an expanding range of courts. The
potential for fragmentation with differing lines of jurisprudence, overspecialization, irreconcilable holdings and conflicting obligations is real.
On the positive side, however, the international legal system is denser,
more active, and arguably more important than ever before. The growing
density and activity of international law presents the potential for fragmentation, but it need not lead there. Four other important trends suggest
the system may not be fragmenting at all.
D. A Common Body of Applicable Law
Most international tribunals—despite their functional differentiation—share a common body of law which tends to preserve a unified
international legal system. In this volume, Pauwelyn draws a significant
distinction between the jurisdiction and the applicable law of the ever
growing number of international tribunals. As he observes, most of the
functionally distinct tribunals continue to apply the same body of law—
general international law—despite their differing jurisdictional mandates
or treaty foundations.33 Many specialized courts include “general international law” as well as their own particular treaty regime as part of the
law applicable before the tribunal.34 This is important, for it means that
31.
See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 30, at 289.
32.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 503, 533 (1995).
33.
Pauwelyn, supra note 4, at 911.
34.
For example, the Chapter XI dispute settlement mechanism of NAFTA allows tribunals to “decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules
of international law.” NAFTA, supra note 13, at art. 1131. Similarly, the International Tribunal
on the Law of the Sea must “apply” the International Convention on the Law of the Sea “and
other rules of international law not incompatible” with the convention. International Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 22, at art. 293. For a detailed discussion of the
relationship between WTO rules and public international law, see generally Joost Pauwelyn,
Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other
Rules of International Law (2003); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International
Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535 (2001). The recently established African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights applies the African Charter of Human and
Peoples’ Rights as well as “any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States
concerned.” Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establish-
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even functionally specialized tribunals remain part of an integrated and
interconnected system and have recourse to the same basic sources of
international law. Hence, when conflicts do arise among legal rules, they
tend to occur within the context of shared legal norms.
This common body of applicable law highlights a possible solution
to the danger of conflicting obligations or judgments. Many of the other
papers in this volume have observed that the growing number of legal
rules and adjudicatory fora significantly increases the chances that a
state will owe incompatible obligations to two other states. Admittedly,
international law as it operates today has only limited means for resolving such conflicts. The rules of lex posterior and lex specialis are
generally insufficient to resolve the range of potential conflicts that may
arise.35 A shared set of background legal rules means that these courts
will look to the same body of law to resolve conflicts when they do arise.
Moreover, this common body of applicable law means that modifications
to these background conflicts rules within international law can provide
most international tribunals with new ways to reconcile conflicts, without the need to amend the foundational treaties of each particular court.
A national example is useful here. In the U.S., choice of law and
conflict of law rules provide litigants and adjudicatory bodies with guidance as to which body of law to apply and how to resolve conflicting
obligations.36 Through alterations in the background rules of international law, either through treaty or customary developments, it is not
inconceivable that a parallel set of conflict rules can be developed at the
international level. Though clearly lacking the biding authority of the
U.S. Congress, the International Law Commission has begun to consider
such a set of rules for the international system, as further detailed in
Gerhard Hafner’s contribution to this volume.37
E. A Robust Interjudicial Dialogue
Counterbalancing the danger of fragmentation is an increasingly loud
interjudicial dialogue. This dialogue has important implications for the
unity of the international legal order as it provides actors at all levels with
means to communicate, share information, and possibly resolve potential
conflicts before they even occur. This interjudicial dialogue has been relatively well documented and occurs at three distinct levels. Supranational
courts are engaged in dialogue with one another, national courts are citing
ment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), at art. 7.
35.
Pauwelyn, supra note 4, at 908.
36.
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1996).
37.
Hafner, supra note 3, at 856–58.
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to supranational courts, and national courts are in direct conversation
with one another.
Supranational tribunals are now regularly conversing with other supranational courts when similar legal issues arise. Charles Koch’s
discussion of Vermeulen and Emesa Sugar in this volume is indicative of
how two international courts can think collectively on similar questions,
even when they disagree.38 When such disagreements do arise, cognizance of one another’s jurisprudence and even direct conversation can
help mitigate conflicting outcomes and ensure coherent rulings. Through
such a judicial dialogue many international courts have collectively decided to give deference to the International Court of Justice. In his
Hague Lectures, Jonathan Charney demonstrated that the views of the
ICJ are “given considerable weight” by other tribunals. Similarly, the
author has suggested an even more robust interjudicial dialogue in the
international criminal field, including the physical exchange of judges
amongst courts and a powerful deference to decisions of the ICTY and,
in the future, presumably the ICC.39
Such an interjudicial dialogue is also occurring between national and
supranational tribunals. Many national high courts—ranging from South
Africa to the United Kingdom—frequently cite to the jurisprudence of
supranational tribunals in their decisions.40 Even the United States—the
last bastion of national exceptionalism—last year, for the first time, cited
to a decision of the ECtHR in a majority opinion by Justice Kennedy
relating to the international standard for the protection of homosexual
41
rights.
A third level of this interjudicial dialogue occurs among national
courts in direct conversation with the courts of other countries, often on
issues of international legal concern.42 In one recent U.S. case, for exam38.
Koch, supra note 6, at 880–84, 884–86 (noting that this can be “seen as a judicial
dialogue on fundamental principles between two supranational tribunals”).
39.
William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002).
40.
See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane, 1995 BCLR 665, para. 68 (CC), available at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/files/deathsn/makwanyane.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) (citing
the European Court of Human Rights); Pratt v. Attorney General for Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769,
785–86 (P.C. 1993) (en banc).
41.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). Note, however, that some justices
have strongly criticized the citation to foreign legal sources. See id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an elaboration of Scalia’s view, see Anne Gearan, Foreign Rulings Not Relevant to
High Court, Scalia Says, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 2004, at A7 (quoting Scalia: “It is my view that
modern foreign legal material can never be relevant to any interpretation of, that is to say, to
the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.”).
42.
See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane, 1995 BCLR 665, para. 16 (CC), available at http://
www.concourt.gov.za/files/deathsn/makwanyane.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) (citing to the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Canadian Constitutional Court, the German Constitutional Court, the
Indian Supreme Court, the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Tanzanian Court of
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ple, Justice Breyer cited to cases from Zimbabwe, India, South Africa
and Canada, most of which in turn cite to one another.43 National judges
are more frequently than ever before citing to one another across borders, meeting in person, or participating in email conversations. Even the
often-reluctant U.S. Supreme Court has engaged in two summits with
the European Court of Justice.44
The significance of this interjudicial dialogue cannot be overstated,
for it has the potential to preserve the unity of the international legal system in the face of potential fragmentation. Such dialogue, of course,
relies heavily upon international judges themselves. If national and supranational judges consider themselves part of a common enterprise of
international law enforcement, they can, through informal agreements,
dialogue, and respect, avoid conflicts before they occur, help to minimize their effects when they do arise, and ensure the development of a
unified system. As judges engage in this dialogue, however, they will be
required to develop new understandings of comity that go beyond deference to foreign laws and interests. Slaughter terms this “positive comity,”
which “mandates a move from deference to dialogue.”45 Such judicial
comity would include “respect for foreign courts qua courts, rather than
46
simply as the face of a foreign government.” Positive comity will require judges to develop a set of shared understandings and principles
regarding when to defer to the adjudicatory mechanisms of other states
and international institutions. Some criteria to consider in developing
this doctrine may include not only the relative weight of national interests at stake, but also the fairness and independence of the courts
concerned, the democratic legitimacy of the foreign government,47 and
the relative competencies of the tribunals in question. Such an expanded
doctrine of comity may well hold the key to avoiding the pitfalls of opposing obligations and conflicting judgments.48
Appeal, among other courts). For a more thorough discussion of such judicial-cross
fertilization, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103, 1105–
06, 1116 (2000).
43.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 66, 281 n.2 (2004); see also
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s
denial of cert).
44.
Slaughter, supra note 43, at 96.
45.
Id. at 250.
46.
Slaughter, supra note 42, at 1112–13.
47.
For a discussion of the use of democratic legitimacy in determining the extraterritorial validity of foreign law, see William W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying
Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 Harv. Int’l L.J.
467 (2001).
48.
For a more detailed discussion of some of the principles that may guide the
relationships between different types of courts in an international legal system, see Martinez,
supra note 7, at 481–520. Martinez suggests, for example, that national courts should
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F. Blending of Procedures and Traditions
A third trend that may prevent fragmentation of the international legal system is a gradual and partial harmonization of previously distinct
procedures and traditions within national and international courts and
tribunals. Common and civil legal systems have, to date, largely operated
under distinct procedural frameworks, and international courts have relied on a range of different procedural models.49 Recently, however,
common threads have emerged between civil and common law systems.
Similarly, international courts have been moving toward a hybrid procedure that merges both common and civil law practices.50 While this
harmonization will not—and should not—result in a single procedure in
all national or international courts, it has the potential to make different
national systems more transparent to outside observers and to promote
greater cross-fertilization, dialogue, and comity among national and international courts.
In this volume, Koch observes that the Administrative Procedure Act
has created a legal subsystem within the United States that is far closer
to European civil law traditions than one might expect.51 Likewise, he
notes how a regular practice in civil-law Belgium (the use of an avocat
general) was deemed by the ECtHR a violation of Article 6(1) of the
European Convention, requiring Belgium to move in the direction of
52
common law procedures. Koch’s two examples highlight how procedures largely deriving from separate traditions can co-exist and how
elements of foreign traditions can be incorporated into national practices.
Nowhere is the merging of civil and common law traditions more
pronounced than in international criminal law. Take, for example, the
ICTY which over the past decade has revised its rules of procedure and
evidence countless times, allowing, for example, the use of affidavit testimony to increase the efficiency of the proceedings.53 In so doing, the
ICTY has moved from a primarily adversarial process to one that accepts

“consider and discuss the effect of their assertion of jurisdiction on the international system”
when determining whether to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 507.
49.
See generally H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (2000).
50.
For a discussion of how human rights law has resulted in some standardization of
international procedures in the criminal law field, see Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards
An International Criminal Procedure (2001).
51.
Koch, supra note 6, at 895 (noting that “in the bosom of the US common law is an
alternative view or rather a plethora of alternative views”).
52.
Id. at 893.
53.
Patricia M. Wald, To “Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence”: The Use
of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 Harv. Int’l L.J.
535, 539 (2001).
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many practices of the inquisitorial model. As ICTY Judges Richard
May and Marieke Wierda observe, after these changes at the ICTY “the
presentation of evidence has followed the ‘adversarial’ model, whereas
the rules governing the admissibility of evidence may be seen as more
akin to the ‘inquisitorial’ model.”55 Though some view this new procedure as a departure from both civil and common law, at the least it
represents a new procedural model that draws on and merges both traditions.56
This coexistence of adversarial and inquisitorial procedures within a
single legal system and the emergence of common international procedures can help retain the unity of the international legal system. They
suggest the possibility of a global legal culture—a set of shared under57
standing, if not shared practices—for international tribunals. The more
these different systems have in common, or at least the more they understand one another, the greater likelihood of communication, comity, and
complementary rulings.
G. The Hybridization of International Law Enforcement
One of the most significant recent developments in the enforcement
of international criminal law—and potentially in international law enforcement more generally—is the proliferation of so-called “hybrid”
tribunals adjudicating international crimes in post-conflict states. Although these courts operate only within a subfield of international law,
they are indicative of a growing fusion of national and international law
enforcement. Moreover, they suggest ways in which the international
legal system can accommodate legitimate difference of national choices
within a unitary legal order.
The “hybrid” title given to such courts stems from the fact that they
explicitly seek to blend domestic and foreign elements, employing both
local and global judges and applying a mix of international and national
law. Such courts are generally established based on an agreement
between a national government and the United Nations that provides for
54.
See generally Máximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International
Criminal Law and Binary Thinking About Criminal Procedure (manuscript on file with author) (observing changes in ICTY procedure, many of which find their roots in civil law, and
suggesting the emergence of “managerial judging” in international criminal tribunals).
55.
Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 Colum. J. Transnat’l. L. 725, 727 (1999).
56.
See, e.g., Langer, supra note 54, at 5 (arguing that “ICTY criminal procedure is best
described today as close to the managerial judging system and as a blend between an originally adversarial system and certain new case-management techniques”).
57.
Koch, supra note 6, at 898 (noting that “there are ideas in these legal cultures that
would be valuable to the world. What is need[ed . . . are] the methods for tapping the wisdom
of all the world’s legal culture, not to find the superior one”).
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the enforcement of international criminal law, while allowing the
national government some discretion with respect to judicial personnel,
procedure, and even the applicable law.58 For example, the Special
Panels, established by the United Nations Transitional Authority in East
Timor, are empowered to apply both “the law of East Timor” and
“applicable treaties and recognized principles and norms of international
59
law.” Similarly, the Special Court for Sierra Leone is competent to
prosecute “violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law.”60 These hybrid courts not only bring together national and
international law but also employ a mix of local and foreign judges. The
Special Panels operating in East Timor have one East Timorese judge
and two foreign judges on each panel,61 while the Special Court for
Sierra Leone includes one judge appointed by the Government of Sierra
Leone for every two chosen by the U.N. Secretary General.62 Similar
hybrid tribunals have been proposed for Iraq,63 Cambodia,64 and the
65
Democratic Republic of Congo, while a variant on this theme is
66
currently in operation in Kosovo.
Such hybrid tribunals are situated precisely at the intersection between the national and international systems, an area likely to be central
to the future development of international law. They represent one powerful model through which national and international legal systems are

58.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtagreement.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
59.
United Nations Transitional Authority of East Timor (UNTAET), June 6, 2000,
UNTAET/REG/2000/15.
60.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, available at http://www.sierraleone.org/specialcourtstatute.html.
61.
UNTAET/REG/2000/15, supra note 59.
62.
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 60, at art. 12.
63.
See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity, Dec. 10,
2003, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2004). In October 2004, the U.N. and the Government of Cambodia concluded an agreement
establishing this newest hybrid court. See Amy Kazmin, Cambodia in Agreement on U.N.
Genocide Tribunal Plan, The Financial Times, Oct. 5, 2004, at 13.
64.
See Sok An, Office of the Counsel of Ministers, Presentation and Comments to the National Assembly on the Draft Law on the Establishment of
Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (Dec. 29, 2000 & Jan. 2,
2001) (on file with author).
65.
See Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Balancing Peace, Justice, and Stability: A Special Tribunal in the Democratic
Republic of Congo 24 (2004) (on file with author).
66.
See generally Laura A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and
International Courts: the Case of Kosovo, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 1059 (2003).
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communicating and influencing one another. Similarly, they suggest a
means by which the international system can accommodate legitimate
difference at the national level by including local judges, prosecutors,
and procedures, while still maintaining the fundamental principles of a
unified system. Some may deem these hybrid courts as another example
of the fragmentation of the yet-infantile system of international criminal
law. A more accurate interpretation is to see such hybrid courts as part of
a system of multilevel global governance in which the national and international levels are more deeply intertwined than ever before.
These last four trends—a common body of applicable law, a robust
interjudicial dialogue, the blending of national legal traditions, and the
development of hybrid enforcement mechanisms—go far to ensure the
unity of the international legal system, counterbalancing potential fragmentation. By communicating with one another, respecting and even
learning from one another’s traditions, and applying the same general
international law, international lawyers, judges, and treaty drafters can
counter the potential for fragmentation of the international legal system.
Preserving the unity of international law will require conscious choices
and effort by all participants in the system. But, these four trends suggest
common ground upon which such a system can be built.

II. Toward a Pluralist International Legal System
The international legal system today appears to be at the center of
two opposing sets of forces—one set pushing toward fragmentation, the
other toward interconnection and coherence. As these forces interact, a
new type of international legal system is emerging—one that is neither
fully fragmented nor completely unitary. The emerging system may be
best described as pluralist. A pluralist legal system accepts a range of
different and equally legitimate normative choices by national governments and international institutions and tribunals, but it does so within
the context of a universal system. Anthony Appiah expresses this idea in
terms of a system that celebrates “difference [but] remains committed to
the existence of universal standards.”68
67.
For a more detailed discussion of the operation of these courts, see Burke-White,
supra note 39, at 30–76. For a discussion of the relationships between these courts and their
implications for the international legal system, see id. at 86–101.
68.
K. Anthony Appiah, The American University in an Age of Globalization, Lecture
at the Princeton-Oxford Conference on Globalization at Oxford University (June 15, 2002).
While “cosmopolitanism” might be a more accurate term than pluralism given the emphasis
on diversity within the confines of universal standards, the term pluralism is chosen so as to
explicitly avoid association with the debates at the Institut de Droit International in the 1870s
and the more recent renewal thereof by Maartii Koskenniemi and others. See, e.g., Maartti

BURKE-WHITETYPE.DOC

978

12/7/2004 1:25 PM

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 25:963

Benedict Kingsbury has traced elements of such international legal
pluralism back to Alberico Gentili who, writing in 1598, advocated a
kind of “pragmatic pluralism” through “his concept of an international
society open to all organized political communities and based upon essential minimal rules for coexistence and the pursuit of common
interests.”69 In a more modern form, international legal pluralism recognizes the value of diversity in the choices, traditions, and approaches of
international actors when those actors create rules, procedures, and even
courts. Yet, this modern form of pluralism operates within what David
Held terms “a framework of universal law.”70
To put it more concretely, the pluralist conception of the international legal system recognizes—and possibly thrives on–the diversity of
the system. A wide range of courts will interpret, apply, and develop the
corpus of international law. States will face differing sets of obligations
that may even be interpreted differently by various tribunals and may at
times conflict. Possibly most significantly, national and international
legal processes will interact and influence one another, resulting in new
hybrid procedures, rules, and courts. Yet, these developments will occur
within a common system of international law engaged in a constructive
and self-referential dialogue that consciously seeks to maintain the coherence of the overall system.
The respect of legitimate difference inherent in such a pluralist
conception may actually enhance the effectiveness of international law
by increasing the legitimacy and political acceptability of international
legal rules.71 Take, for example, the hybrid tribunals described above. By
allowing differentiation based on local procedures and preferences,
hybrid tribunals are far more likely to be deemed legitimate by national
populations than the oft-criticized international courts such as the
ICTR.72 Such legitimacy, in turn, may generate greater “compliance

Koskenniemi, Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck’s Messianic World, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L.
& Pol. 471, 483 (2003); see also Benedict Kingsbury, Neo-Madisonian Global Constitutionalism: Thomas M. Franck’s Democratic Cosmopolitan Prospectus for Managing Diversity and
World Order in the Twenty-First Century, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int’t L. & Pol. 291 (2003).
69.
Benedict Kingsbury, Confronting Difference: The Puzzling Durability of Gentili’s
Combination of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative Judgment, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 713, 723
(1998).
70.
David Held, Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty, 8 Legal
Theory 1, 38 (2002). In Slaughter’s formulation, such pluralism is termed “legitimate difference” and is described as “a principle that preserves diversity within a framework of a
specified degree of convergence.” Slaughter, supra note 43, at 248–49.
71.
For a more detailed discussion of the principle of legitimate difference, see
Slaughter, supra note 43, at 247–250.
72.
For an example of such criticism, see Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of Hate/Crimes of
State: Lessons From Rwanda, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 365 (1999).
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pull,” to use Thomas Franck’s term. After all, the political decision to
create and support such a tribunal is far easier when the court can be
tailored to the local needs, conditions, and even political constraints of
the host state. Such diversity or legitimate difference may then promote
compliance, resulting in a more effective, more active, and more robust
international legal system.
Whether or not we accept the claim that the international legal system is fragmenting is a critical choice. The international legal system is a
constructed system and our views of that system may well become a
self-fulfilling prophecy. If international legal actors think of the system
as fragmented, it may well become so as new obligations are created and
enforced without consideration of the coherence of the overall system.
However, if international lawyers, judges, and even politicians conceive
of the system as pluralist, they are far more likely to leave room for legitimate difference, while recalling the importance of unity in crafting
rules, developing procedures, building institutions, or issuing judgments.
From a constructivist perspective, a pluralist system will operate most
effectively if it is closely linked to the aforementioned interjudicial dialogue. Through this dialogue the diverse elements of the international
legal system can remain part of an interconnected global conversation
that recognizes both diversity and unity.
Admittedly, such a pluralist conception of the international legal system is not a cure-all for the dangers of fragmentation. The difficulties of
conflicting obligations identified by Hafner and Pauwelyn remain; further efforts at legal development will be needed to resolve them.
Nonetheless, this pluralist vision does provide an alternative and potentially powerful means of conceptualizing the future development of
international law. By ensuring uniformity while embracing legitimate
difference, the international legal system can be made both more legitimate and more effective.

73.
See generally Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Am. J.
Int’l L. 705 (1988).

